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Abstract
This paper aims to comparatively examine the integration practices of Japan and Korea at 
the state level to help understand the measures being taken to mitigate some of the migratory 
pressures resulting from deepening Asian regional integration and to enhance human security 
in the region.  Specifically, the author examines the state-led initiatives vis-à-vis Japan and 
Korea's burgeoning multicultural societies in an effort to comparatively analyze their approaches 
to securing the human rights and security of their growing migrant populations.  Through 
identifying parallels and differences in the approaches of the Japanese and Korean governments 
in terms of securing human rights and security, the author will outline potential areas of 
cooperation in dealing with growing trans-border migration between these two countries and in 
Asia in general. 
1. Introduction 
The functionalist approach to international integration stresses economic enmeshment as its 
foundational component.2  Initial institutional cooperation in the sphere of economics is expected 
to create a platform for further cooperation and eventually broader institutional cooperation in the 
spheres of economics, politics, society, and security. In contrast, the neo-functionalist approach to 
integration focuses, among other things, on the role of pressure groups in democracies and their 
ability to infl uence the direction of policy.3  Specifi cally, it is argued that democratic governments 
provide political space for pressure groups to infl uence the direction of policy and subsequently 
these pressure groups become the primary instigators of cross-border economic liaisons in order 
to realize the comparative advantages that exist between one or more countries. Initial coopera-
tion then leads to broader based cooperation and integration through economic complementari-
ties. In both cases, economic cooperation through institutional cooperation is considered to be 
a precursor to narrowly defi ned integration in the economic sense, and broader integration that 
encompasses integration in political, social, cultural and security spheres.
An interesting theoretical and empirical question is whether, en route to broader integration 
in the Asian region, the economic dimension of integration can be circumnavigated by coopera-
tion in other spheres and be used as a springboard for different kinds of institutional coopera-
tion leading to broader integration.  International migration may be fertile ground to address 
this question since much of the migration that takes place occurs at a regional level,4 as it is the 
case in Asia.  Regional organizations and forums such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR and APEC have 
engaged in discussions on cooperation in the area of migration; but to date only the European 
Union has adopted comprehensive common policies,5 and Asia lags far behind. 
Conspicuously absent from regional organizations with some interest in international migra-
tion are cooperative linkages among groups or organizations centered in Northeast Asia despite 
the fact that this part of Asia is home to a large and growing number of international migrations, 
18,576,777 of them in 2005, for example.6  In fact, rather than being known for cooperative ini-
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tiatives to mitigate pressures and abuses stemming from international migration, Northeast Asian 
countries have been characterized as engaging in ?benign neglect? with respect to migration.7 
Stephen Castles attributes this ambivalence to several factors, including interest confl icts in im-
migration countries, interest confl icts and hidden agenda in migration policies, the structural de-
pendence on emigration, and structural dependence on immigrant labor.8 
Notwithstanding this ?benign neglect,? in his 2004 article on cross-border migration, Akaha 
argues that increased flows of cross-border migrants have given rise to human security issues 
such as the rights of foreign laborers/foreign workers, human rights protection, and human traf-
fi cking.  He adds, however, that these issues have yet to threaten national security interests and 
that we have yet to see cooperation between the major recipients of cross-border migration.9 
Similarly, Lee, Oishi, and Douglass and Roberts speak not only of the feminization of migration 
but also that countries in Northeast Asia are a source, transit, and destination for the traffi cking of 
women for sexual exploitation, and nexuses where foreign migrants are exploited in trainee sys-
tems which do not meet national labor standards.10 
I argue that recent developments in Japan and Korea in the area of social integration policies 
and multiculturalism are congruent with broader integration in the region based on potential in-
stitutional cooperation in the sphere of human security.  Specifi cally, in this paper I examine the 
social integration practices of Japan and Korea at the state level to help understand the measures 
being taken to mitigate some of the migratory pressures resulting from deepening Asian regional 
integration at the economic level, to enhance human security in the region and perhaps act as a 
platform for further integration based on cooperation in the area of human security.  By examin-
ing the state-led initiatives vis-à-vis Japan and Korea?s burgeoning multicultural societies, we 
can glean an understanding of their approaches to securing the human rights and security of their 
growing migrant populations.  Through identifying parallels and differences in the approaches of 
the Japanese and Korean governments we can delineate potential areas of cooperation in dealing 
with growing trans-border migration between these two countries and in Asia in general, which 
may act as a platform for further integration at a broader level, overcoming the challenges to inte-
gration identifi ed by Frost.11 
This paper is divided into three sections. The fi rst section will limit the parameters of this 
paper by defi ning the terms migrant, human security, human rights, and social integration.  In the 
second section, I will examine demographic data and the current data on the number of foreign 
residents in Japan and Korea in a comparative manner to demonstrate parallels and dissimilari-
ties in terms of the two countries? demographic challenges.  As part of this second section, I will 
also describe the integration practices of Japan and Korea, highlighting important turning points, 
policy emphasis, and specifi c measures which are being put into place to help meet the coming 
demographic conundrum.  The third and fi nal section will identify areas of potential cooperation 
that will help Japan and Korea better deal with the integration of foreign residents to manage 
their demographic plight.
2. Migrants, Human Security, Human Rights, and Social Integration 
Before embarking on the main argument of this paper I should clarify several terms, begin-
ning with the term ?migrant?.  Migrant or someone who is considered a migrant is defi ned as 
a person who has lived outside his/her country of birth for at least 12 months.12  More specifi -
cally, according to the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants, a migrant worker is defi ned 
as a ?person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in 
a State of which he or she is not a national.?13  Separation from one?s country of birth can also 
include for reasons such as marriage or education but does not include a result of human traffi ck-
2
???????????????????? ????????????????????
ing or for the purpose of exploitation nor does it include refugees.  Moreover, it should be noted 
that in some countries, such as Korea and Japan, the term ?migrant? can include those foreign 
residents who are born within their borders, including Special Permanent Residents ?tokubetsu 
eijusha? in Japan. 
 The second term to be defi ned is that of human security.  Owing to the focus on Japan and 
Korea and in consideration of their high level of development, I would like to borrow and revise 
Lee Shin-wa?s concept of maximum human security, which she defi nes as the ability of an indi-
vidual to achieve self-development through equal opportunity, social and political empowerment, 
and the establishment of a sustainable civil society.14  In this paper, with its focus on inter-region-
al immigration and the status of migrants in Korea and Japan, we must focus on Lee?s criteria 
of the ability of an individual to achieve self-development through equal opportunity and social 
empowerment rather than political empowerment and the sustainability of civil society. The ra-
tionale for not focusing on the latter two criteria is that political empowerment is constitutionally 
limited in both states for non-citizens.   
Whereas human security focuses its limits on opportunity and social empowerment, human 
rights in the context of this paper echoes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established 
in December 10, 1948.  Although not universally agreed upon, this declaration can be used as 
a barometer when arguing potential areas of cooperation between Japan and Korea by stressing 
generally agreed upon notions of human rights including but not limited to the equality before the 
law, equal access to public services, the right to favorable conditions of work, and equal pay for 
equal work as laid out in the thirty articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.15 
Lastly, Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann of the European Forum for Migration 
Studies ?EFMS? at the University of Bamberg, Germany defi ne social integration as ?the inclu-
sion and acceptance of immigrants into the core institutions, relationships, and positions of a host 
society,? and further state:
Integration is an interactive process between immigrants and the host society.  For im-
migrants, integration means the process of learning a new culture, acquiring rights and 
obligations, gaining access to positions and social status.  For the host society, integra-
tion means opening up institutions and granting equal opportunities to immigrants.16 
In essence, this defi nition stresses the bidirectional process of adapting, acculturating, and 
opening institutions to newcomers such that through realizing their rights and obligations as new 
members of a society, they can prevent marginalization, while at the same time contributing to 
their new home if they choose to do so. 
 In this paper, the above defi nition of social integration needs to be expanded to include all 
categories of foreign residents, ranging from trainees and foreign workers, to long-term residents 
and permanent residents to Special Permanent Residents. The rationale for this inclusive defi ni-
tion is that neither Japan nor Korea has an offi cial immigration policy; rather they admit foreign-
ers into the labor force using various admission schemes.  These schemes do not anticipate and, 
therefore, do not include a road map towards citizenship. 
3. Demographic Conundrum: Twin Plagues of a Graying Population and Low Birth Rates 
 
 Japan 
As of 2005, Japan?s population began to decline owing to low birth rates, a reality that will 
affect the country?s future economic vitality.17   In fact, Japan has entered a longstanding depopu-
lation process.  The population is expected to drop to 115 million by 2030 and approximately 90 
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million by 2055 ?see Figure 1.0? and according to Goodman and Harper this drop will have three 
major impacts: ?1? increase in public spending on pensions; ?2? high dependency rations be-
tween workers and nonworkers; and ?3? slowdown in consumption.18   At minimum, the greater 
tax burden on a smaller number of tax payers will result in a larger share of national budget allo-
cated to health care, social services, and pensions, decreased economic strength because of lower 
consumption rates, loss of position in international society ?lack of resources, decreased innova-
tiveness?, and a hollowing out of countryside ?potential loss of agricultural independence?. 
Figure 1. Actual and Projected Population of Japan, 1950-2050
Year
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Source:  National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. Tokyo: National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006, http://www.ipss.
go.jp/pr-ad/e/ipss_english.pdf, p. 6. ?Accessed January 3, 2009?
Like other nations, Japan is using foreign workers to compensate for this trend.  Migrant 
workers fi nd employment ?legal and illegal? in Japan?s manufacturing industries and other forms 
of employment deemed dirty, dangerous, and diffi cult ?3 D?s?. Since 2003, we have seen a steady 
increase in the overall number of foreign residents in Japan ?see Table 1?.  
In terms of the number of foreign nationals in Japan by status of employment, we have also 
seen a steady increase in the number of foreign workers since 2003 in all categories of visas ex-
cluding entertainment visas ?see Figure 2?.  The drop in foreign workers with entertainment visa 
status was largely due to Japan?s efforts to reduce human traffi cking into Japan after being placed 
on the United States State Department's Tier 2 Watch List for Traffi cking in 2003. 
According to the Statistics Bureau of Japan, the number of foreigners living, working, and 
studying in Japan reached 2,084,919 in 2006, representing 1.63 percent of the total population 
?see Figure 3?.19   This number represents a 46 percent increase in the number of registered for-
eigners compared with 1994. This fi gure does not include the number of known illegal foreign 
residents which, according to the Ministry of Justice, has climbed to 207,299 ?see Figure 4?.20 
Moreover, the number of foreign residents could be much higher if we considered those children 
that result from international marriages called ?daburu? in Japan.21 
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Table 1. Changes in the Number of Registered Foreign Residents 
Source:   The Ministry of Justice, ?Immigration Control 2007,? http:// www.moj.go.jp, p. 20. ?Accessed Janu-
ary 4, 2009?  
Year
Status of Residence
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total 1,915,030 1,973,747 2,011,555 2,084,919 2,152,973
Professor 8,037 8,153 8,406 8,525 8,436 
Artist 386 401 448 462 448 
Religious Activities 4,732 4,699 4,588 4,654 4,732 
Journalist 294 292 280 273 279 
Investor/Business Manager 6,135 6,396 6,743 7,342 7,916 
Legal/Account Services 122 125 126 141 145 
Medical Services 110 117 146 138 174 
Researcher 2,770 2,548 2,494 2,332 2,276 
Instructor 9,390 9,393 9,449 9,511 9,832 
Engineer 20,807 23,210 29,044 35,135 44,684 
Specialist in Humanities/International Services 44,943 47,682 55,276 57,323 61,763 
Intra-company Transferee 10,605 10,993 11,977 14,014 16,111 
Entertainer 64,642 64,742 36,376 21,062 15,728 
Skilled Labor 12,583 13,373 15,112 17,869 21,261 
Cultural Activities 2,615 3,093 2,949 3,025 3,014 
Temporary Visitor 74,301 72,446 68,747 56,449 49,787 
College Student 125,597 129,873 129,568 131,789 132,460 
Pre-college Student 50,473 43,208 28,147 36,721 38,130 
Trainee 44,464 54,317 54,107 70,519 88,086 
Dependent 81,535 81,919 86,055 91,344 98,167 
Designated Activities 55,048 63,310 87,324 97,476 104,488 
Permanent Resident 267,011 312,964 349,804 394,477 439,757 
Spouse or Child of Japanese National 262,778 257,292 259,656 260,955 256,980 
Spouse or Child of Parmanent Resident 8,519 9,417 11,066 12,897 15,365 
Long Term Resident 245,147 250,734 265,639 268,836 268,604 
Spacial Permanent  Resident 475,952 465,619 451,909 443,044 430,229 
Without Acquiring Status of Residence 16,628 18,236 15,353 17,415 13,960 
Temporary Refuge 30 31 30 30 30 
Others 19,376 19,164 20,736 21,161 20,131 
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What is driving the migration into Japan?  The Ministry of Justice in its Immigration Con-
trol 2007 Report outlined six explanations for the increase: ?1? availability of Trainee Programs; 
?2? special residency and opportunities for Nikkeijin22; ?3? abundant jobs for foreign students 
and entertainers; ?4? job opportunities for undocumented workers; ?5? family reunion opportu-
nities for those who belong to an international marriage; and ?6? the ease at which foreigners can 
enter Japan and overstay their visa.23 
It is clear from the above that Japan faces the challenge of untangling its own Gordian knot, 
namely, how to combat its declining population and, at the same time, how to successfully inte-
grate the growing number of non-ethnic Japanese residents who are choosing to become perma-
Figure 3.  Changes in the Number of Registered Foreign Nationals and Its Percentage of the Total 
Population in Japan 
Source: ?2008 Immigration Control,?  Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008, p. 18. 
Figure 4. Estimated Number of Visa Overstayers by Major Nationality/Place of Origin 
Source: ?2008 Immigration Control,?  Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008, p. 30. 
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nent residents in order that they can contribute to Japan economically, culturally, politically and 
socially.  
An essential task in the integration of newcomers is the promulgation of substantive mea-
sures to prevent discrimination ?racial or otherwise?, exploitation, and marginalization: videlicet, 
wage differences for equal work, barring of entry or refusal of services based on nationality,24 
truncated access to public rights including but not limited to national health care, social welfare 
programs, exclusion from family registries based on nationality,25 education gaps,26 high truancy 
among foreign youths,27 and legal protection.  
Korea 
Korea is also experiencing a very rapidly graying population and a crisis-level low birth rate. 
As of 2007, Korean women were averaging just 1.26 children compared with Japanese women 
at 1.34.28  This below replacement rate level compounds the current labor shortage as young Ko-
rean men and women tend to shun blue-collar employment opportunities for their white-collar 
counterparts.29  Magnifying the problem associated with labor shortages and a declining tax pool, 
according to the Asian Demographic and Human Capital 2008 Data Sheet, Korea?s aging popu-
lation ?those 65 years old and above? will represent 10 percent of the total population in 2007, 
23 percent by 2030 and 32 percent by 2050.30  More illustrative of coming crises is that in 2007 
the aging population was supported by a tax base of 72 percent, but this is expected to drop to 
65 percent in 2030, and then 57 percent in 2050.  Echoing Goodman and Harper?s analysis of the 
impact of Japan?s population pyramid reversal, Korea will inevitably face similar economic and 
social hardships at a level even higher than Japan owing to a lower birthrate which will have the 
effect of having an even smaller tax base to contribute to existing social welfare programs and 
economic productivity.
Korea has also seen a large increase in the number of foreign residents working legally and 
illegally in country beginning in 1987.31 According to Kwon Ki sup, Director of Foreign Employ-
ment Division of the Ministry of Labor, there is ?an embedded structural demand for foreign 
labor, which is being compounded by Korea?s aging population.?32  In 1987, Korea was home to 
approximately 6,409 migrant laborers, and the number soared to at least 640,000 in 2007 ?see 
Table 2?.33
Foreign Residents ?Unit : a person?
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total 481,611 566,835 629,006 678,687 750,873 747,467 
Registered 210,249 229,648 252,457 437,954 468,875 485,144 
Short-term stayers 271,362 322,451 357,340 218,426 259,464 236,958 
Resident report for ethnic Koreans 14,736 19,209 22,307 22,534 25,365 
2005
Resident report for ethnic Koreans
Short-term stayers
Registered
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Table 2. Increase in Legal and Illegal Foreign Residents in Korea between 2000 and 2005 
Source: ?Immigration Bureau Publications,?  Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, 2008.
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Above and beyond the infl ux of migrant laborers into Korea, brides hailing from Southeast 
Asia have also been major sources of the increase of non-Korean residents, resulting in a remark-
able international marriage rate, 13.6 percent in 2006.34 
The continued influx of migrant workers into Korea can be attributed to several factors. 
First, as with many developed nations, there is a structural demand for migrant workers that in 
part contributes to national economic prosperity by being able to continue to manufacture goods 
at competitive prices using cheaper foreign labor.  Second, trainee programs continue to persist, 
creating a window to enter into the Korean economy.  Third, proactive post-graduation employ-
ment programs for international students who have graduated from Korean universities boost the 
number of foreigners staying in Korea for work purposes.  Fourth, the continued economic gap 
between Korea and sending countries makes Korea an attractive destination for migrant workers. 
Fifth, the continued dearth in potential spouses in the Korean countryside has created a niche for 
marriage migration, infusing the Korean countryside with not only foreign brides but also sky-
rocketing numbers of children who belong to international families.35 
Japan and Korea share many similarities when we comparatively examine their demo-
graphic profi les and the numbers of foreigners continuing to settle in their borders ?see Table 3?. 
In particular, both countries will experience a reversal of their respective population pyramids 
which will affect their socio-economic vitality and international standing.  Both countries are 
also seeing a large infl ux of foreigners who come to each respective country as a foreign worker 
Table 3. Demographic Data on Japan and Korea through to 2050 
Source:  http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/cgi- bin/worldguidecompare.pl?country1=1024&country2=924&cou
ntry3=%23&country4=%23&submit=Compare%21&compare=Population&compare=PopGrowth&co
mpare=PopMig&compare=PopLife&compare=AgeStructure&compare=PopBirth&compare=PopDeat
h&compare=LabourForc ?Accessed August 2008? 
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or spouse, for education, or for other purposes. Collectively they present a diffi cult challenge in 
terms of how best to integrate them, protect their labor rights and from exploitation, and assure 
that their basic human security needs are met.  They also present a great opportunity for them to 
contribute to the long-term socio-economic prosperity of each respective country.  
4. Social Integration and Migration Practices in Japan and Korea
The recognition of the need to develop social integration and migration policy in Japan and 
Korea has had different roots.  In the case of Japan, bottom-up and local government movements, 
such as the Kanagawa Prefectural government led by Governor Nagasu, were instrumental in the 
development of both social integration policy and the recognition of the challenges faced by for-
eign residents at the local level.  First, it was the protection of human rights, recognition of needs, 
and the need for equality of Korean residents that were integral parts of the development of for-
eign resident policies.  
Second, both bottom-up and top-down initiatives contributed to the creation and shaping 
of foreign resident policy.  Bottom-up initiation was exemplifi ed by Korean demands for equal-
ity and access to social welfare programs, whereas top-down initiatives were exemplifi ed by the 
recommendations of the then Ministry of Home Affair?s so-called local internationalization and 
Governor Nagasu?s expansion of the parameters of the people-to-people diplomacy declaration.36 
Nagasu believed that local governments and internationalization were inextricably linked with 
the national government not being able to provide for all the needs of its citizens. This included 
the basic needs of citizen security and welfare for all residents of Kanagawa, Japanese and non-
Japanese alike.   
In part owing to the local government-led and grass-roots activism, in March 2006 Japan?s 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications ?MIAC? promulgated the Plan for the Promo-
tion of Multicultural Coexistence.  Its major pillars include: ?1? communication assistance; ?2? 
lifestyle assistance; ?3? creation of multicultural coexistence; and ?4? establishment of a sys-
tem to promote multicultural coexistence.37  The MIAC multicultural coexistence plan?s recom-
mended policies aim to overcome systemic, cultural, and language barriers in Japanese society. 
By overcoming these barriers, the MIAC plan is promoting more diverse social conditions which 
in turn can contribute to the development of a more pluralistic society.  Policies espoused by the 
MIAC multicultural coexistence plan wed systemic, language, and cultural initiatives in an effort 
to open access to Japanese society and by consequence weave diversity into the fabric of society 
in the spheres of housing, education, and public services.
 Notwithstanding the direction towards greater plurality in Japanese society that the MIAC 
policy seems to espouse, it is clear that at the cognitive and emotive levels multicultural coexis-
tence as a means of creating a co-identity, as a tool for enhancing a shared national identity based 
on mutual respect and understanding of ethno-cultural backgrounds is absent from the MIAC 
multicultural coexistence policy.
Japan?s Ministry of Justice ?MOJ? has also put forth several strategies to manage Japan?s 
labor shortage, to maintain its raison d?être of protecting domestic security, and to realize Japan?s 
international commitments to economic partnership agreements.  Specifi cally, the Ministry is ad-
vocating the acceptance of foreign workers in professional areas, the acceptance of high skilled 
laborers, the acceptance of non-professional/technical acceptance, and demand-based acceptance 
in areas such as nursing-care.38  The Ministry of Justice has remained reticent to the idea of more 
open policies towards migration, stressing instead ?that Japan should not rely on foreign workers, 
especially not the unskilled.?39  In fact, the Ministry of Justice prefers to maintain the temporary 
nature of migrant laborers, which manifests itself as a three-year nonrenewable system,40 while 
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boosting immigration procedures to decrease the number of foreigners who come to Japan for 
work without the appropriate visa qualifi cation.41 
The newest proposed immigration plan 2008, put forth in June 2008 by a group of conserva-
tive Liberal Democratic Party ?LDP? lawmakers, is the latest attempt to maintain Japan?s eco-
nomic competitiveness and contribute to abating the problems associated with Japan?s population 
decline.  The immigration proposal includes fi ve major tenets: ?1? raise population of non-Japa-
nese residents to 10 percent of total population by 2050; ?2? increase number of asylum seekers 
accepted to 1,000; ?3? increase foreign students to 1 million by 2025; ?4? guarantee ?better? 
human rights; and ?5? emphasis on accepting immigrants and their families as new Japanese 
nationals.42  Collectively, the proposal aims to broaden the acceptance of individuals who can 
contribute to Japan socioeconomically and to those who have been educated and to some degree 
already assimilated into Japanese society.  
The above three approaches to social integration and migration have different focuses.  The 
MIAC initiative revolves around a strong focus on communication, lifestyle assistance, multicul-
tural awareness, provision of services on par with Japanese, but offers no road to citizenship, nor 
a national action plan to promote integration at a signifi cant level.  The MOJ on the other hand 
conceptualizes policy related to migrant workers as temporary and thus sees no need for long-
term investment in social integration programs.  Lastly, the newly proposed immigration policy 
attempts to embrace the notion of immigration to combat Japan?s declining population and labor 
shortage through a proposed system that prioritizes those immigrants who are already partially 
culturally assimilated through language or those who possess needed human capital to contribute 
to Japan?s socio-economic prosperity. 
 To date, social integration and migration policies in Japan have been mostly initiated by lo-
cal governments and grassroots organizations.  Nonetheless, the LDP Immigration Plan and the 
Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence by the MIAC mentioned above illustrate a 
shift towards top-down policy initiatives that aim to broach some of the challenges associated 
with migration and social integration in the country.
 In contrast, Korea?s social integration and migration policy development has been fuelled 
by three important factors: ?1? sudden increase in international marriages; ?2? the rapid rise in 
the number of foreign residents; and ?3? government initiatives to protect the rights of migrant 
laborers ?legal and illegal? in the early 1990s.43 
International marriages brought to the forefront three important issues related to the need 
for social integration and formal migration policies.  First, the substantial number of international 
marriages that were occurring in Korea vividly illustrated that Korea was undergoing a transfor-
mation of its ethnic composition from within, requiring policies that would smoothly integrate 
spouses of Korean nationals into Korean society.  Second, Korean media revealed the widespread 
abuse of international spouses, prompting the Korean government to take fi rm measures to ad-
dress the plight of a growing number of women settling in Korea.  Third, and perhaps more im-
portantly, international marriages highlighted the educational and social prejudice problems faced 
by children of mixed marriages, encouraging the Korean government to invoke several steps tar-
geting issues associated with discrimination and social integration that will be outlined below.
The rapid increase of foreign residents since the 1990s and the associated rampant abuses of 
foreign residents, ranging from lack of pay for industrial accidents to low wages and clear viola-
tions of the Labor Standard Act in Korea, also brought to light the societal discrimination faced 
by foreign residents in Korea.  As a result, Korea?s Ministry of Labor announced initiatives to 
protect the rights of migrant laborers ?legal and illegal?, including the enforcement of the Labor 
Standards Act on companies that hired illegal foreign workers.44 
The above three factors have been instrumental in Korea?s about-face approach to multicul-
turalism, social integration policy, immigration policy, and anti-discrimination policy since 2004. 
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In 2004 the Ministry of Labor implemented the ?Employment Permit System ?EPS?? as a re-
sponse to foreign migrant workers organizing unions to protect themselves from labor standards 
violations.45  Protecting migrant workers from discriminatory wage treatment, the EPS regime 
ensures that migrant laborers do not settle in Korea by making the EPS a 3-year, non-renewable 
permit.  The EPS was then followed by several initiatives directly related to the plight of spouses 
and children of international marriages, including the 2006 establishment of the ?Council for 
the Protection of Human Rights & Interests of Foreign Nationals,? the ?2006 Plan for Social 
Integration of Mixed Bloods and Migrants,? the 2006 ?Plan for Social Integration of Marriage 
Migrants,? and the 2006 ?Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners? ?effective July 18, 2007?.46 
According to Yoon In-Jin, the promulgation of these initiatives was in part a result of several fac-
tors, including the 2006 announcement by the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Affairs 
that ?South Korea is rapidly becoming a multiracial and multicultural society? and ?the trans-
formation of S. Korea into a multiracial and multicultural society cannot be stopped.?47  Other 
scholars, such as Kim Hee Jung have a more sinister explanation for these policies, and assert 
that rather than targeting and protecting the human rights and treatment of all foreign residents, 
these policies in fact only target a very small number of foreign residents who belong to the Ko-
rean household through marriage.48 
Despite the more pessimistic interpretations of recent social integration, human rights and 
immigration initiatives by the Korean government, I argue that the strong adherence to the Labor 
Standards Act in 1997, the legislation of the ?Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners? in No-
vember 2006, and the establishment of the Council for Protection of Human Rights and Interests 
of Foreign Nationals are the strongest evidence supporting Korea?s shift to towards social integra-
tion and migration policies that protect migrant workers using the same labor standards as those 
for Koreans.  The initiatives also include the strong anti-discrimination measures, advocacy for 
the protection of human rights, and the inculcation of stronger multicultural awareness education 
programs, such as the recently announced ?Overcoming Prejudice against Different Cultures? 
curriculum put forth by the Ministry of Education and Human Development.
 
5. Potential Areas of Cooperation  
In arguing that it is in the interest of Japan and Korea to cooperate in the area of human se-
curity, I will borrow from Robert Scalapino who conceptualizes integration into three forces: ?1? 
communalism; ?2? nationalism; and ?3? internationalism.49  At the communalism level, Scala-
pino asserts that cooperation can be based on shared ethnicity, affi liation or regional identity.50  In 
the case of Japan and Korea, local governments, grass-roots organizations, churches, and even 
unions have strong, established track records of cooperating transnationally, even at times at odds 
with respective national governments.  Good examples include regional organizations such as the 
Northern Region Hokkaido Concept ?hoppoken koso?,51 economic exchange/networks, munici-
pal diplomacy,52 and recently the joint workshop held by the ILO ápropos internationalizing labor 
standards.53  
Cooperation in the sphere of human security which includes human and labor rights, be-
tween Korea and Japan can and should proceed fi rst in the communitarian sense, to strengthen 
current social integration and migration polices, and approaches to labor and human rights as 
well as human security.  The rationale for cooperation at this level is that it bypasses many of the 
challenges to integration outlined by Frost, such as border disputes, differences in historical inter-
pretations, and a host of other obstacles to cooperation at high levels.54 
First, in the area of labor rights, the protection of all workers? rights in both Japan and Korea 
is a useful example of potential communitarian-based cooperation between the two countries that 
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could be a basis for broader regional cooperation.55  Both Rengo ?Japanese Trade Union Confed-
eration? and KOILAF ?Korean International Labor Foundation? are strong proponents of labor 
rights protection for all workers, including foreign workers.  To illustrate, Rengo?s offi cial stance 
vis-à-vis foreign workers is as follows: 
All individuals working in Japan should be subject to labor laws and regulations guar-
anteeing proper working conditions and occupational health and safety standards, and 
be protected by labor and social insurance schemes. Even if foreign workers are illegal, 
in violation of the Immigration Act, and are thus engaging in unauthorized work, their 
human rights should be observed equally with those of Japanese. Also, as a matter of 
course, they should be subject to Japanese labor laws and regulations and should be 
given protection under labor and social insurance schemes.56 
This protective stance related to foreign workers in Japan resonates well with the enforce-
ment of Korea?s Labor Standards Act in 1997 for employers of foreign migrants but also with 
KOILAF?s stance on foreign migrant workers, which states: ?To protect the basic labor rights of 
foreign migrant workers, we provide labor relations education and grievance counseling to lead-
ers of migrant worker communities and counselors of civil support organizations.?57 
 With congruent views on the labor rights of foreign workers within each country?s respec-
tive borders and a shared affi liation with workers of all nationalities, there is a foundation for 
regional, or at least bilateral cooperation in the communitarian sense to lobby each respective 
government to more strongly advocate labor rights for migrant workers and to fortify their social 
integration programs so that foreign workers can be more productive, even if the length of their 
stay may be limited.  Owing to the structural dependence on foreign labor in both countries, labor 
unions in Japan and Korea also can have a key role in ensuring a steady supply of reliable foreign 
labor for small and medium sized enterprises ?SMEs? by creating attractive working environ-
ments which not only pay well compared to sending countries, but are also attractive because of 
their strong advocacy of labor rights, human rights, and human security issues.58  In this light, 
stronger cooperation between unions in both countries can broaden and increase the quality of 
labor and human rights for migrant workers and decrease exploitation of migrant workers while 
contributing to maintaining the economic productivity of each country.  I would add that strong 
advocacy at the transnational level not only protects the labor and human rights of migrant work-
ers in the receiving country, but also protects the labor and human rights of Japanese and Korean 
citizens while working in their own country.
According to Lim, Japanese and Korean labor unions such as the Zentoitsu Labor Union 
?ZWU? and the Labor Pastoral Center ?LPC? have been effective in securing the labor rights of 
foreign migrants by appealing to international labor standards set forth by the ILO.59  However 
successful both unions have been in securing labor rights and subsequently a component of hu-
man security for migrant workers, the bureaucratic agencies and employers still can ignore or 
subvert these progressive approaches because of what Lim points out as the lack of a judicial 
body that can enforce, rather than just persuade parties to abide by labor standards.60 
Despite the challenge of lacking enforcement of labor standards, I reason that labor unions 
in both countries still have a vested interest in cooperating with each other to protect the labor 
rights of all workers for several reasons.  Firstly, cooperation in the area of labor rights protec-
tion ensures that businesses do not opt for cheap foreign labor in lieu of more expensive domestic 
labor, thus securing their own employment.  Secondly, broader cooperation between unions may 
enhance each union?s ability to lobby their own respective government in terms of bringing to 
light the abuses and exploitation of migrant and non-migrant workers.
The second potential area of communitarian cooperation is at the local government level. 
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Japanese and Korean local governments are often the immediate interface for foreign residents 
with each respective society.  Upon arrival in area country, foreign residents register with the lo-
cal government in the area in which they reside.  This registration process makes them eligible 
for social welfare, pensions, health care, and in many cases multilingual advisory services to help 
them navigate through administrative procedures, legal questions, etc.  Because of the division 
of labor between the national and local governments, local governments have been the primary 
administrative bodies building the infrastructure to socially integrate foreign residents.  These 
policies translate into communication assistance, language training, culture training, lifestyle as-
sistance, multilingual information services, anti-discrimination awareness education, and coun-
seling for newcomers.61 
Here, Japanese local governments have a potential leadership role.  Japanese local govern-
ments can and should share with their Korean counterparts their extensive successful and unsuc-
cessful social integration strategies that have been in development since the early 80s.  In particu-
lar, the Hamamatsu Declaration, with its focus on education, social security, and the revamping 
of foreign registration, offers a treasure trove of valuable suggestions on how to better integrate 
foreign residents into local communities.62   Specifi cally, the Hamamatsu Declaration provides 
substantive strategies to deal with education issues faced by the children of migrant workers, the 
children of international marriages, and the establishment of language classes to equip foreign 
residents with the language and cultural skills they need to improve their life while in Japan.  The 
declaration also offers concrete strategies to cooperate with medical organizations, NPOs, NGOs, 
and other volunteer groups, and consider creating a system where non-Japanese residents can 
avail themselves of multilingual medical care and information with peace of mind.
Similarly, other Japanese municipalities with multicultural coexistence plans, such as Shin-
juku Ward, Adachi Ward, and Tachikawa City located in the Tokyo Metropolis, are well situated 
to share their well-developed multicultural coexistence plans which have been developed to meet 
each local government?s particular needs.  They have developed integration strategies which to 
different degrees focus on cultural, structural, interactive, and identifi cational integration.63, 64 
Whereas the Japanese local government strength relies on more developed social integration 
strategies in accordance with their longer experience with foreign residents, Korean non-govern-
mental organizations offer a third potential opportunity for communitarian-based cooperation. 
Korean NGOs can take the lead in social integration of foreign residents by sharing their experi-
ence in: ?1? coordination with NPOs, unions, and church groups to facilitate social integration; 
and ?2? strong advocacy of the protection of the human rights of foreign residents, which in-
cludes labor rights and protection against other kinds of exploitation. 
In the case of coordination with NPOs, unions, and church groups to facilitate social integra-
tion, Seol and Skrentny and Yoon assert that non-governmental groups form strong lobby groups 
which not only infl uence the direction of policy development vis-à-vis foreign residents, but also 
provide a plethora of services to foreign residents.  For example, citizen-led multiculturalism 
manifests itself as citizen-led NPOs and religious groups who assist foreign residents, marriage 
migrants, and children of international marriages.  Activities are broad in scope but include the 
establishment of migrant women?s counseling centers such as the Solidarity for Migrant Human 
Rights and the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea.65  In each case, human rights, la-
bor rights, and the protection from exploitation are the major tenets of these organizations and 
point to another potential area of cooperation that can be leveraged to broader integration be-
tween Korea and Japan.  
Japan, with its relative dearth in citizen-led multiculturalism and advocacy groups for for-
eign residents, may have much to learn from Korea.  With shared views on human rights, labor 
rights, and protection from exploitation, Japanese NGOs could fi nd their Korean colleagues to be 
useful partners in promoting their agenda to local and state governments, but also in the areas of 
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organization and experience in inculcating international standards into their rhetoric in order to 
put pressure on concerned parties.  
The benefi t of cooperation at the communitarian level between non-governmental organiza-
tions is several fold.  First, sharing resources and expertise allows both partners to enhance their 
domestic agenda.  Simply, they can harness and learn from the successes and failures of each 
partner?s experience to refi ne and strengthen domestic initiatives.  For example, Korean non-gov-
ernmental organizations have utilized the plight of marriage migrants and international children 
to broaden the human rights, labor rights, and human security agenda such that it applies to all 
foreigners in Korea.  
Second, because of the more nebulous and apolitical nature of people-to-people cooperation 
at the NGO level, there is room to broaden cooperation beyond solely Korea and Japan.  
 Third, and equally important, is that bilateral networking can also be expanded to coopera-
tion with human rights groups in the labor ?migrant? source countries as well.  Cooperation that 
results from liaisons between Japanese and Korean organizations and groups has the potential to 
enhance their collective leadership capacity vis-à-vis the migrant labor source countries, espe-
cially if the bilateral cooperation is extended to NGOs and other human rights advocacy groups 
in source countries.  As a consequence of these activities, we could see multilateral cooperation 
emerge between Japan, Korea and a third country based on shared affi liation and interests. 
6. Conclusion 
Both Japan and Korea are seeing a rapid transformation of their ethnic composition result-
ing from low birth rates, aging populations, international migration, and international marriages. 
These Northeast Asian neighbors are also facing many similar challenges as a result of common 
demographic trends, structural dependency on foreign labor sources, and international marriages. 
Challenges include the best manner in which to integrate newcomers so that they can contribute 
to their new homes.  Human rights and labor rights protection are also important challenges to be 
overcome in both countries.  Policies that prevent the abuse of newcomers, migrant workers, and 
non-ethnic spouses and exploitation are areas that both nations can and should fi nd areas to coop-
erate. 
Using Scalapino?s concept of integration at the communitarian level, I demonstrated that 
there already exists ample opportunity for Korea and Japan to cooperate at the non-governmental 
organization, local government, and the labor union level to deal with trans-border migration, se-
curing human and labor rights as well as human security in general.  This paper showed that it is 
in the interest of labor unions to cooperate, as it not only helps to secure the rights and prosperity 
of foreign migrant workers but it also enhances their own employment prospects by ensuring that 
SMEs do not engage in discriminatory employment practices that favor migrant workers because 
they do not fall under labor standard acts.
On the Japanese side, local governments and their initiatives in the area of social integration, 
human rights protection is also a realm ripe for cooperation.  The experience and more developed 
social integration policies vis-à-vis foreign residents that already exist in Japan can and should be 
valuable learning devices for Korean counterparts on what programs are effective in integrating 
foreign residents.  
Conversely, Korean NGOs have shown leadership and effectiveness in developing support 
programs that secure human and labor rights as well as protect foreign residents, marriage mi-
grants, and children from international marriages from marginalization and/or exploitation.
Although a considerable vacuum exists at the national level in terms of cooperation that 
would contribute to broader integration in the area, integration between these two neighbors can 
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proceed at the communitarian level in the area of human security and human and labor rights 
protection.  Being based on shared values, maintaining prosperity of citizens and non-citizens, 
and efforts to achieve international standards in the areas of labor and human rights and human 
security, this initial seed of cooperation at the non-state level can provide a strong foundation for 
broader regional integration efforts. 
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